000 03037nam a22002537a 4500
008 210111b2017 a|||f mb|| 00| 0 eng d
040 _aEG-CaNU
_cEG-CaNU
041 0 _aeng
_beng
082 _a610
100 0 _aSally Mosaad Mohamed
_9268
245 1 _aA Postmortem Forensic Analysis for a JavaScript Based Attack /
_cSally Mosaad Mohamed
260 _c2017
300 _a77 p.
_bill.
_c21 cm.
500 _3Supervisor: Ahmed Fahmy
502 _aThesis (M.A.)—Nile University, Egypt, 2017 .
504 _a"Includes bibliographical references"
505 0 _aContents: 1 AnOverviewofWebBrowsersandTheirPossibleAttacks 1 1.1 InternetBrowsers . ........................... 1 1.2 Webbasedattacks . .......................... 4 1.2.1 Drive-by-Download . ...................... 6 2 DrivebyDownloadAttackandWebBrowserForensics 13 2.1 BrowserForensics . ........................... 16 2.1.1 BrowserForensicTool(BFT): . ................ 19 2.1.2 NETANALYSIS: . ....................... 19 2.1.3 Nirsoft: . ............................ 21 2.1.4 InternetEvidenceFinder(IEF): . ............... 22 2.1.5 CacheBack: . .......................... 22 3 ProposedSystemDescription 27 3.0.6 DataGathering: . ........................ 30 3.0.7 DataAnalysis . ......................... 32 3.0.8 DataClassication . ...................... 35 4 ExperimentandFindings 39 5 ConclusionandFutureWork 45 A FirefoxExtensionSourceCode 47 B AnalyzerSourceCode C AnalyzerOutputData 54 Bibliography
520 3 _aAbstract: In recentyears,attacksthattargetbrowsers'vulnerabilitieshaveincreasedsignif- icantly.Aninnocentusermaybeluredtoaccessuntrustedwebsiteandmalicious contentpassivelydownloadedandexecutedbyher/hiswebbrowser.Thisattack vectorisknownas,Drive-by-Downloadattack.Systemsandsecurityresearchers haveaddressedthisattackfromdierentperspectives.Severaltechniquesandtools wereintroducedtodetectandpreventDrive-by-Downloadattack.However,few researcheshaveaddressesthebrowserforensicsperspectivesto(1)identifytraces (2) reconstructtheexecutedeventsofadownloadedmaliciouscontent,toassist the digitalforensicinvestigationprocess.Inthisstudy,adigitalforensicmethodis introducedtoinvestigateawebbrowsersubjecttoDrive-by-Downloadattack.We developedaProof-of-ConceptimplementationbasedonFirefoxbrowser-extension to inspectandanalyzemaliciousURLsthathostmaliciousexecutables.The developedsystemistestedusinganumberofmaliciouswebpagesandsuccess- fully identiedthedigitalevidenceoftheattack.81%oftheidentiedevidence wereartifactsthatwebelievecouldassistforensicinvestigatorstodetermineif a web-browserorasystemsubjecttoexaminationiscompromisedornot,and the indicationsofcompromises.Theindicationforcompromisecouldbeadown- loaded maliciouscode,acreatedtemporaryleand/oralinktomaliciousserver that downloadedmalwareintothesystem.
546 _aText in English, abstracts in English.
650 4 _aInformatics-IFM
_9266
655 7 _2NULIB
_aDissertation, Academic
_9187
690 _aInformatics-IFM
_9266
942 _2ddc
_cTH
999 _c8793
_d8793