Abstract: In recentyears,attacksthattargetbrowsers'vulnerabilitieshaveincreasedsignif- icantly.Aninnocentusermaybeluredtoaccessuntrustedwebsiteandmalicious contentpassivelydownloadedandexecutedbyher/hiswebbrowser.Thisattack vectorisknownas,Drive-by-Downloadattack.Systemsandsecurityresearchers haveaddressedthisattackfromdierentperspectives.Severaltechniquesandtools wereintroducedtodetectandpreventDrive-by-Downloadattack.However,few researcheshaveaddressesthebrowserforensicsperspectivesto(1)identifytraces (2) reconstructtheexecutedeventsofadownloadedmaliciouscontent,toassist the digitalforensicinvestigationprocess.Inthisstudy,adigitalforensicmethodis introducedtoinvestigateawebbrowsersubjecttoDrive-by-Downloadattack.We developedaProof-of-ConceptimplementationbasedonFirefoxbrowser-extension to inspectandanalyzemaliciousURLsthathostmaliciousexecutables.The developedsystemistestedusinganumberofmaliciouswebpagesandsuccess- fully identiedthedigitalevidenceoftheattack.81%oftheidentiedevidence wereartifactsthatwebelievecouldassistforensicinvestigatorstodetermineif a web-browserorasystemsubjecttoexaminationiscompromisedornot,and the indicationsofcompromises.Theindicationforcompromisecouldbeadown- loaded maliciouscode,acreatedtemporaryleand/oralinktomaliciousserver that downloadedmalwareintothesystem.